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27 JUN 1969

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Information Processing Staff

SUBJECT : Annual Report on Intelligence  
Information HandlingREFERENCES : A. IHC-D-130/1, 22 May 1969, Same  
Subject  
B. Your memorandum of 27 May 1969,  
Same Subject

The Deputy Directorate for Support has two contributions, one from the Office of Communications and one from the Office of Security, for the Annual Report on Intelligence Information Handling.

Communications has requested that the following be included in Chapter 10:

1. It has been known for many years that electromechanical equipments often emit spurious radio and acoustic signals when operating. In some instances, these signals, or radiations, can be directly related to special functions or processes of the machinery. If this machinery processes classified information, it is often possible to intercept, analyze and recover the classified data from these signals. The security implications are obvious, especially where the U.S. can directly control only a limited area surrounding its classified data processors.

2. CIA is examining this problem for many classes of machines, and emphasis is being placed specifically on computer-type systems. The goal is to provide effective countermeasures which will eliminate this special security hazard and to encourage manufacturer design of technically secure equipment.


The Office of Security input is attached for your consideration.

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Support Services Staff

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Attachment

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Annual Report on Intelligence Information Handling

Subject: Your memorandum of 15 May 1978, concerning the Annual Report on Intelligence Information Handling.

The Deputy Director for Support has two contributions, one from the Office of Communications and one from the Office of Security, for the Annual Report on Intelligence Information Handling.

Communications has requested that the following be included in Chapter 10:

1. It has been known for many years that electronic eavesdropping equipment often operates with a very low probability of detection when operating. In some instances, these signals are very weak and can be detected only by special functions on the receiver. If this technology is used to intercept signals, it is often possible to intercept signals and recover the classified data from these signals. The security implications are obvious, especially when the signals can be intercepted only by a limited area surrounding the classified data processors.

2. CIA is examining this problem for many classes of signals, and emphasis is being placed specifically on communications-type signals. The goal is to provide effective countermeasures which will minimize the special security hazard and to ensure a continuous design of technically secure equipment.

The Office of Security is also requested to provide information for the Annual Report on Intelligence Information Handling.

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